Reforms at Risk: What Happens After Major Policy Changes Are by Eric M. Patashnik;

By Eric M. Patashnik;

Reforms in danger is the 1st publication to heavily learn what occurs to sweeping and possible winning coverage reforms once they are handed. so much books specialise in the politics of reform adoption, but as Eric Patashnik exhibits the following, the political fight doesn't finish whilst significant reforms develop into enacted. Why do yes hugely praised coverage reforms undergo whereas others are quietly reversed or eroded away? Patashnik friends into the most severe arenas of domestic-policy reform--including taxes, agricultural subsidies, airline deregulation, emissions buying and selling, welfare kingdom reform, and reform of presidency procurement--to determine the criteria that let reform measures to outlive. He argues that the reforms that stick spoil an current coverage subsystem and reconfigure the political dynamic. Patashnik demonstrates that sustainable reforms create confident coverage feedbacks, rework associations, and infrequently unharness the "creative destructiveness" of industry forces. Reforms in danger debunks the argument that reforms unavoidably fail simply because Congress is prey to important pursuits, and the booklet presents a extra lifelike portrait of the chances and boundaries of optimistic switch in American executive. it's crucial studying for students and practitioners of U.S. politics and public coverage, providing sensible classes for a person who desires to make sure that hard-fought reform victories live on.

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If open rules during floor debates permit recorded votes on particularistic amendments, then rules can be closed. As chapter three discusses, tax reform coalition leaders adopted procedural strategies to mask legislators’ individual responsibility for closing inefficient loopholes favored by powerful clientele groups. Leaders met in secret, avoided recorded votes, and adopted restrictive rules to prevent emasculating amendments, giving lawmakers the opportunity to vote for a major tax bill that offered significant rate reductions to average citizens.

With so much “free money” on the table, policymakers were eager to distribute some to the many interest groups pressing for special benefits within the tax code. The concentrated benefits of tax preferences allowed lawmakers to claim credit with recipients and lobbyists, while the diffuse costs ensured indifference from mass publics. 4 Beginning in the early 1960s, tax policy economists and lawyers argued that tax preferences created complexities and gross inequities across taxpayers with similar incomes.

In sum, reform advocates can craft decision-making procedures that encourage lawmakers to respond to diffuse interests. Collective responsibility and the pursuit of individual self-interest can be mutually reinforcing. Making Tactical Concessions to the Opposition Finally, reformers must often make tactical concessions in order to build a winning political coalition. The concentrated costs associated with gen- 02 Patashnik 16-34 22 • 6/5/08 3:28 PM Page 22 Chapter 2 eral-interest reform proposals may initially render them unfeasible.

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