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The other is a distinction among three questions which are often confused in discussions of instrumentalism. These questions are: ( 1) What is the aim or purpose of physical theories? (2) What is the status of 'theoretical entities' like atoms and electrons? g. particles and waves) in physics? That these questions are closely related is obvious, but they are not identical or equivalent. For instance, one need not share Duhem's distaste for the use of visualisable models to agree with him that they are heuristic devices only, and not descriptions of underlying realities; that is, one could think that their heuristic suggestiveness outweighs the danger that their use will mislead physicists into thinking that they are offering such descriptions.

But Braithwaite thinks that his analysis assigns the central place to that aspect of religious belief which believers in fact regard as the essential aspect. The interpretation of religious beliefs, against which Braithwaite specifically raises the objection that it fails (from the believer's point of view) to take them seriously, is the Instrumentalism in Religion 45 theory that they are primarily expressions of feeling. But he could also, with some degree of justice, object on the same grounds to the theory that religious beliefs are factual propositions about transempirical entities.

I am inclined to disagree with it, but cannot argue the question here. What I do want to stress here is that Duhem's instrumentalism has only rather limited consequences for the relevance of science to theology. Physical theories do not bear directly on theology, but they are indirectly relevant through their bearing on the choice between metaphysical systems, and physics like any other science can tum up empirical facts capable of directly supporting or conflicting with theological doctrines. One startling consequence should be briefly mentioned.